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Current Developments in the Economics of Regulation
Sam Peltzman
The economics of regulation seems to have arrived at a crossroads.
Activity in the field is burgeoning and threatening to burst the boundaries
established by theoretical insights that just yesterday seemed adequate
to guide research for some time. My task here will be to step back and try
to set some of the new work in a longer perspective, a perspective which I
think indicates that we ought to be cautious about what to expect from
it.
I find it useful, like so many who are charged with summarizing the
work of academic conferences, to proceed taxonomically, So, I will or-
ganize my remarks around three principles that I believe are suggested
by the history of the economics of regulation. The first of these is that
the theory seems to move in waves, in the sense that once-respected
theoretical insights seem easily superseded by new ones. This partly
reflects the muddled state of the field, where normative and positive
issues tend to get indiscriminately run together and a common theoretical
bond is lacking. The first identifiable wave, which held center stage up
to about 1960, is sometimes called the "public-interest" view. It can be
found in one form or another in the seminal work of Hotelling (1938) and
in generations of text books on public utilities. The focus is on market
failure, typically of the natural monopoly variety, as the stimulus for
regulation. While the public-interest view of regulation as guardian against
monopolistic inefficiency always viewed itself as more proscriptive than
descriptive, it did claim some practical insights. Surely a finding that, for
example, electric rates were not held down by regulation would represent
a loss of innocence.
When the work initiated by Stigler and Friedland (1962) began re-
vealing that regulation did not work as the public-interest view held that
it should or did, the way was prepared for a new generalization: the cartel
or "capture" view of regulation, whereby compact interest groups,
usually of producers rather than consumers, were held to dominate
regulatory decisionmaking. The public-interest view became more clearly
a normative paradigm. Its underlying welfare economics remained a
valid way of organizing discussion about what regulators ought to be
doing, but any belief that regulators often did what they should was nowPeltzman 372
severely tempered. For about a decade the capture model provided a
major framework for the positive analysis of regulatory behavior. This
work is not yet complete, as evidenced by Leone and Jackson's intriguing
attempt to bring out the rent-generating elements for producers in pollu-
tion-control regulation (a form of regulation that appears, on its surface,
to cut against the producer's interest). Nevertheless, the simple, straight-
forward view of regulation as a cartel enforcement device now is coming
under serious question. Perhaps this is due partly to the lavish growth of
forms of regulation that, like pollution control, seems to require much
excavation before any cartelizing element emerges. More likely, it is due
to a growing recognition that very substantial rent-dissipating elements
(such as the perpetuation of excess capacity in railroads, which Levin's
article documents so well) were an integral part, and not merely a side-
show, of regulatory activity in areas where the producer-protection
model seemed most fruitful (for example, transportation).
While it may be premature to call it a new wave, this conference seems
to confirm what is at least a new ripple. For want of a better term, I will
call it "creeping realism" ("creeping" both because it is not a radical
break with either the public-interest or producer-interest models and
because, as I will argue, its analytical structure is so unevenly balanced
that walking straight will be difficult). What it seems to me the creeping-
realism literature is trying to do is to integrate some of the newer econom-
ics of political decisionmaking with some of the elements of the older
normative economics of regulation. The older welfare economics is
invoked to rationalize one or another form of regulatory intervention,
but the resulting real-world institution then must bend to the realities of
politics. And politics means coalition-building and log-rolling, so that
nothing so simple as a "public" interest or a "producer" interest is going
to predominate.
It is best to let a more precise characterization of this literature emerge
from a few examples provided by this conference. The article of Leone
and Jackson is a good starting point. Somewhere in freshman or sopho-
more economics the normative rationale for pollution control is typically
spelled o>utr and then later our charges are told that the way regulators
actually do things leaves much to be desired. Leone and Jackson see
more here than a confused attempt to control pollution. If this were the
whole
1 story, we should see congressmen from districts with large paper
mills (an: industry with large pollution-control costs) opposing increased
restrictions. They do not. Why not? Possibly they are implicitly bought
off by the design of the regulation, the very design that seems laden withCurrent Developments 373
inefficiency to the conventional analyst. Leone and Jackson then find
empirical support for this possibility. In effect, the regulators levy a
higher implicit tax on new entrants than on established mills. With just
a little growth in demand, the net effect of the regulation is to generate
nontrivial rents for established mills. Thus, a potentially antagonistic
and powerful interest is brought within the coalition served by the regula-
tors. Of course, potential entrants are hurt, but you will not find the
Association of Potential New Entrants listed in the Washington telephone
directory.
Sometimes creeping realism means a partial revival of a public-interest,
or at least a non-producer-interest, view. For example, minimum capital
requirements have long been recognized as a potential restriction of entry.
Munch and Smallwood and their discussants focus on the possible
benefits for consumers of insurance, who might otherwise be left stranded
in a bankruptcy. In effect, the minimum capital requirement substitutes
for the high costs facing the untutored consumer in evaluating the financial
capacity of the insurer.
The last example I want to cite is the article of Willig and Bailey. Their
wholly normative paper breaks with the venerable tradition of separating
allocative from distributive issues. They want to guide a regulator who
wishes to set prices that take simultaneous account of efficiency and
income distribution norms. What about the old story that redistribution
is better done by explicit money transfers than by the Public Service
Commission? Willig and Bailey are silent on this. Though I am persuaded
by Gary Becker's (1976) argument that the old story is wrong, I suspect
that Willig and Bailey's silence is deliberate. For all our past hand-
wringing about how messy it is, regulators persist in allowing distributive
considerations to intrude on, and even dominate, their pricemaking.
Even the pure theorist, Willig and Bailey seem to be saying, had better
adjust to this reality.
The approach of Willig and Bailey illustrates my second principle of
the economics of regulation, which is that practice leads theory. The full-
blown development of the welfare economics of natural monopoly lagged
the growth of electricity and telephone regulation. The capture models
lagged the most notable empirical counterparts—ICC regulation of
trucking, organization of the Civil Aeronautics Board, oil import quotas,
and so on. The creeping-realism literature seems to be lagging two events,
one practical and the other intellectual. The practical antecedent seems
to be the growth of the whole panoply of safety, environmental, and
consumer-information regulation, whose very existence or whose practicePeltzman 374
has often proved difficult to rationalize theoretically. The intellectual
precursor seems to be the perceived difficulties with earlier models about
which one or another theory did seem to have a lot to say. For example,
if as the capture model holds the ICC is in business to organize a trucking
cartel and enforce rate-making collusion among the railroads, why does
it harm both captors by perpetuating excess railroad capacity?
Of course, intellectual and real-world developments are related here.
The newer forms of regulation, such as consumer protection and pollution
control, began their great growth at about the same time the capture model
was making its biggest splash in academia. However, the Second Principle
was at work, and most students of regulation did not rush to apply the
capture model to the new regulations. Instead, they seemed willing, for
a time, to try to understand the new regulations within the framework
of the older public-interest model. When it became clear that the newer
agencies were no more dedicated to Pareto optimality than their ancestors,
the first reaction in the literature (still the dominant one) was to tell the
new regulators to mend their ways. Kneese's 1971 work on the potential
gains from effluent fees comes immediately to mind. The next reaction
was more analytical. Much of what I have called creeping realism seems
to be focusing on the new regulation. It seems to say that if the public-
interest model doesn't explain how the new regulation works and if the
capture model has been found wanting in explaining important aspects
of the behavior of those agencies to which it seems most applicable,
we now have all the more reason to develop a new synthesis.
However, we ought to embrace any new model of regulation with some
caution. Implicit in much of what I have so far said is, perhaps, another
principle of the economics of regulation: that the currently fashionable
theory is usually wrong, or at least misleading. This conference provided
more examples of this Third Principle than I have already touched upon.
For example, none of the literature spawned by Stigler and Friedland
argued very strenuously against the notion that natural-monopoly
problems were an initial impetus to regulation of utilities. The story
seemed to be that once the clamor for regulation had been heeded, the
industry was able to assert itself in the mundane activity of the new
agencies. However, Jarrell (1978) argued that the facts are more com-
patible with the view that industry interest was present at the creation
of these agencies as well. The article of Fuss and Waverman, though
working from a much different perspective, also ends up questioning
the natural-monopoly rationale for telecommunications regulation. TheCurrent Developments 375
elaboration of the producer interest in pollution regulation by Leone
and Jackson serves to update this story.
As I have pointed out, the producer-protection model has met its
own share of skepticism, both at this conference and elsewhere. Levin's
article adds new insights into work begun by Keeler (1974), Friedlaender
(1971), and others. But, these have a common theme. The ICC's attempt
to preserve excess capacity in railroading is an integral part of its history,
and not some aberration of a cartel manager manque. It constitutes a
huge tax on the wealth of railroad owners for the benefit of a few shippers.
Moreover, Keeler pointed out that U.S. railroads are not alone in facing
such a tax. Similarly, Munch and Smallwood's discussion of the potential
benefits to at least some consumers of capital requirements was echoed
at the conference in discussions of similar benefits from more explicit
entry control, like licensing. Occupational licensure may have been the
first form of regulation to which economists applied the producer-
protection model. Adam Smith deserves paternity here, as in much else.
His descendants, like Friedman and Kuznets and Kessel, gave the model
considerable empirical content. However, the realist challenge intrudes
here too. The potential empirical importance of a consumer interest in
shaping licensing regulation was debated at the conference and is the
subject of ongoing work by Holen, Leffler, and Gaston and Carroll. It
is, however, too early to tell whether this work will end up confirming
my Third Principle, which is that the predominant licensing-as-cartel
model is wrong.
However, if that principle has any validity, I believe that its lesson may
be especially important for the new realist literature, as well as for some
of the more institutionally innocent work that seeks new applications for
market-failure models. The realist literature seems to be organizing
around the following pattern: Select an area where producer protection
has seemed important (for example, licensing, minimum price, or entry
regulation); then show that there is a potential market failure that makes
it credible for a coalition of producers and consumers, not merely the
producers alone, to seek regulation. Or, reverse the pattern: Select an
area, such as pollution, where market failure had seemed the most com-
pelling force for regulation; then show how regulation of the market
failure can be structured to serve a producer interest at the same time,
and thereby enhance the political survival value of the regulatory in-
stitutions. This is an interesting research strategy that, I believe, deserves
encouragement. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere (1976) that diversifica-Peltzman 376
tion of the interest groups served by a regulatory agency, rather than
specialization, ought to be the common pattern.
There appears to be a dangerous asymmetry in the way this research
is carried out: One part of the model (the cartel element) gets serious
analytical treatment, while the other (market failure) is hardly developed
beyond the point of vague possibility. Needless to say, the danger of this
asymmetry increases with the emphasis placed on market failure as the
source of regulation.
I can best elaborate on this sweeping claim by making another: Con-
juring up rationales for regulation is too easy a sport; perhaps it deserves
a Pigovian tax. On a few minutes' notice, any competent economist
could apply an externalities model to fashions in clothing, a natural-
monopoly model to stereo equipment (after all, don't they advertise
amplifiers powerful enough to drive all the speakers on your block?), or
a producer-protection model to laws against heroin. The only reason
for taking some applications more seriously than others is our sense of
their empirical importance. This, I would argue, is precisely what led us
10 or 15 years ago to take producer protection seriously as an important
element in regulatory behavior. From the beginning the focus of that
literature was on the importance of the measurable features of that phe-
nomenon, not simply on the legal possibilities embedded in, say, the Civil
Aeronautics Act or the Interstate Commerce Acts; so the literature
developed by estimating the number of firms excluded from one or another
market (for example, Jordan's work on airlines), the size of rents to existing
firms (Friedman and Kuznets [1954] on the AM A), the gap between
competitive and regulated prices (Keeler [1972] on the CAB). The range of
sophistication in this literature is, to be sure, very wide, but most of it
seemed to point in the same direction of pinning down the empirical
magnitudes. And the increased technical virtuosity seems to have resulted
in better or more credible estimates of the size of the regulatory effects.
Perhaps the air-transportation literature, starting from Keyes's work
in the early 1950s, best illustrates these points. By now any new entrant
to any part of the capture literature is conditioned to worry not only
about the potential or directional effect of regulation, but about its size.
Note, for example, the procedure of Leone and Jackson. After stating
the rather novel possibility that the EPA is creating positive rather than
negative producer rents, they immediately give a crude estimate of
magnitudes (capital gains of $200 million versus losses of about 1 percent
of this). Had the numbers been reversed, I doubt that the theoretical
possibility would be given much attention.Current Developments 377
This degree of concern for empirical relevance does not, however,
seem to carry over to our treatment of market-failure issues. To be sure,
some of the relevant issues have received analytically sophisticated
treatment attentive to empirical importance. A case in point is the treat-
ment of scale economies in two of the articles presented here. Levin's on
railroad costs makes precise the nature of economies of scale in this in-
dustry, and then proceeds to measure the magnitude of the costs of excess
capacity resulting from restrictions on exit when there are traffic-density
economies. The compelling result is not the theoretical possibility of
suppressed density economies, but their very large magnitude. Similarly,
the main motive to Fuss and Waverman's work seems to be concern
with the extent of scale economies in telecommunications; that is, with
how the economies can be measured in the multiproduct-firm, and how
big the economies are. Again, the interesting result is the sense of em-
pirical proportions conveyed by the work—the suggestion that scale
economies may not be so extensive as heretofore believed. Both these
articles add to previous work. Examples that come to mind are Keeler's
(1972) and Friedlaender's (1971) work on railroad costs, in the case of
Levin, and Christensen and Greene's (1976) work on electric utilities,
in the case of Fuss and Waverman. However, even in the economies-of-
scale literature no one will accuse us of great haste in this search for
empirical relevance. Public utility commissions were being created for
almost a century before this empirical literature became established,
textbooks were written about their operation, and Hotelling made it
evident in the title that his classic article on optimal pricing applied to
railroad and utility rates. This whole enterprise was based on a presumed
but undemonstrated belief in the importance of scale economies in parti-
cular activities.
Much of the current discussion of newly fashionable market failures
seems to be at a similar stage of development. To be sure, vague beliefs
are now enshrined in jargon and clothed in formal models which give
them the correct ritual flavor and exclude the uninitiated. Perhaps a
card-carrying member of the profession should not oppose this too
loudly or even be entirely cynical about it. There is, after all, a gain in
precision in talking about failure of information and insurance markets
instead of about the cheated consumer. My worry is that the professional
discussion here does not seem to be leading toward the next question:
How important are the problems being discussed? Here, I would refer
the reader back to Noll and Joskow's summary of the literature on health,
safety, and performance standards. They review a welter of possiblePeltzman 378
problems with unregulated markets that have cropped up in this literature,
and a modest number of attempts to evaluate the effects of regulation.
But they are as struck as I am by the lack of work on the empirical im-
portance of the theoretical problems. At this stage in the development of
economics, one should have hoped that the empirical question would
be given priority. It does, after all, matter for how seriously we want to
pursue the theoretical enterprise whether 1 percent or 50 percent of the
sales of some product generated negative consumer surplus, just as it
ought to have mattered to the early public-utility economists whether
the output elasticity of total costs was 0.95 or 0.25. Nor do I mean to
imply by this lapse into jargon that the theoretical enterprise has to be
held captive to a sophisticated technology of data production and ana-
lysis. Precise point estimates are not required for getting at gross magni-
tudes. But, at least in the safety-health literature, we have not begun to
find out if the theoretical problems we explore are worth talking about.
The literature on environmental externalities also falls into the "newly
fashionable" category, and the situation here is a little better than in
safety and health. The work by Lave and Seskin (1970) on health effects
of pollution and that of Ridker (1967) and Crocker (1971) on land values
is a start at defining the scope of the problem. But, again, compare the
attention to this basic part of the problem with that given to theoretical
problems which implicitly assume that there is a substantial problem.
I refer here to the literature cited by Noll and Joskow on such matters
as optimal control mechanisms for pollution and the attendant general
equilibrium consequences. Similarly, the bulk of applied research on
pollution control tends to avoid the issue of how important pollution
externalities are, choosing instead to focus on such matters as the costs
of various abatement policies. If someone today asserted that any sub-
stantial reduction in pollution would have trivial benefits, or that the
resources spent in the name of pollution control had trivial effects on
pollution, there would be no substantial concrete basis for laughing him
out of court. Given this state of affairs, we may be seriously compromising
our knowledge about pollution regulation. For all we know, this regula-
tion may be only the disguised form of entry control Leone and Jackson
describe, or a WPA project for the suppliers of control equipment, or
something else that would call for a fundamentally different analytical
framework than we have so far brought to bear on pollution regulation.
My point here is not to propose radically alternative models, since that
would implicitly decide the crucial empirical issues. Instead, I am sug-
gesting that, before we push our normative models into the newer areasCurrent Developments 379
of regulation or try to marry the normative models with economic anal-
yses of politics, we not rush past an essential question: Are the welfare
problems we are invoking trivial or sizable? We may well conclude that
there is more reason to spend analytical energy on the externalities of
automobile pollution than, say, those of automobile colors, in much the
same way that we were able to conclude that there were at least some
interesting scale-economy problems in regulated utilities. However, the
justification for taking this sort of risk is much weaker today than it was
fifty or one hundred years ago, when the tools of empirical analysis were
far less developed.
I do not want to minimize the difficulties inherent in assessing the
magnitude of the problems on which we focus our analysis. One need
only read the discussion surrounding the Fuss-Waverman paper to see
that there are still many difficulties to the measuring of scale economics.
The corresponding measurement problems in the newer areas of regula-
tion are going to be even more formidable, because we will not typically
have something like balance sheets and income-expense accounts to start
from. However, the biggest challenge, I suspect, will be to our imagination
and flexibility in using analytical tools that we already have. If this is
right, then I am more optimistic than Noll and Joskow, at least about
the potential for success.
To be more concrete, let me give a couple of examples of how we might
frame questions that could get us closer to discovering the size of some of
the problems I have mentioned.
• Are consumers behaving in a way consistent with the story that a big
problem exists? For at least some goods there will be some objective
measure of performance: accident frequencies of cars, failure
propensities of insurers, injury frequencies of various occupations.
Given these (or, more precisely, the relevant exogenous components),
we can ask whether the good products or jobs sell at a premium to the
bad and by how much relative to an independent estimate of the extra
costs of the bad product. We will have an interesting problem if this
premium is small, or if the good products do not drive out the bad.
• Does the political process act as if the problem is large or small? By
now we are sufficiently wary not to take at face value the nominal intent
of regulation. Nor can we easily interpret departures from this intent.
Thus, suppose we found that, long after the establishment of a well-
financed and amply empowered Consumer Protection Agency, as many
consumers were being cheated or maimed as before. This could mean
that the cheating and maiming was so small as to be practically
irreducible. It could also mean that the title of the agency was hiding its
objectives. If we found a large physical reduction in consumer fraud or
injury, we would still have to evaluate its economic significance.Peltzman 380
No study of the political process or the markets it regulates can escape
such interpretive problems. Still, I believe we can gain something by
looking for consistencies or regularities in political behavior, because the
political process should not be expected to be indifferent to dead-weight
losses in unregulated markets. These may be tolerated or even encouraged
because they help "buy" another objective, but no rational model of
political behavior would hold the dead-weight losses to be a good in and
of themselves. Thus, if the dead-weight losses are large enough and
inherent in unregulated markets, we ought to expect a consistent political
response.
To uncover this consistency, I believe that the economics of regulation
will have to give up some of its provincial focus on American institutions.
The simple fact that many jurisdictions seem to persist in leaving large
parts of transportation unregulated is telling (if crude) evidence that
unregulated markets do not systematically generate large dead-weight
losses. This is not to say that if regulation were ubiquitous the converse
would be demonstrated. It could be that the forces making for regulation
in the United States are so universally powerful that they can always
overcome dead-weight losses of their own making. However, ubiquitous
regulation would, I think, force us to take more seriously than otherwise
the potential problems with unregulated transportation markets raised by
advocates of regulation. My suggestion is that international comparisons
of regulatory institutions can be a useful check or a crude screening device
for selecting problems that may be worth pursuing. For example, we will
take the possibility of market failure in electricity and telecommunica-
tions more seriously if every important country intervenes in these markets
with seemingly appropriate institutions; we will be more skeptical if
there is the same variety as in transportation. In view of the potential
payoff to a modest analytical effort, there seems to me to be considerable
scope for pursuing international institutional comparisons. If I am right,
this strategy can also have obviously valuable spinoffs—for example,
comparisons of the effects of apparently similar institutions.
These examples are more illustrations of a point than an agenda. The
point is that deficiencies of data or analytical technique are not great
enough to justify our neglect of the crucial empirical issues which have so
far been ignored in analyses of the newer regulatory institutions. If this is
so, perhaps we ought to impose that Pigovian tax on further proliferation
of normative models or on their incipient marriage to the economics of
politics until we begin redressing this neglect.Current Developments 381
Such a reallocation of effort is not, of course, a substitute for a generally
useful theory of regulatory behavior. It is entirely possible that when that
theory is written it will so restructure our analysis of the regulatory process
that the welfare problems that now tend to hold center stage will be pushed
off to the side. We might, in hindsight, regret the time spent in worrying
about their size. However, even though such a theory does not yet exist,
research on specific forms of regulation has to look for some theoretical
grounding. This is now being done by extending traditional normative
models to the newer forms of regulation and by implicitly inserting
specific allocative outcomes into the relevant objective function of regula-
tors. Meanwhile, a good deal of the theoretical work on regulation has
a similar motivation.
The promise of these analyses, either in enhancing our current under-
standing of regulation or in leading to a richer theory, rests on the im-
portance of the problems around which they are organized. This is why
I believe it is especially timely to divert some analytical energy to
discovering the importance of these problems.
The increasing scope and spread of regulation and its impact on aca-
demic research make it almost obligatory for me to discuss policy issues.
While my primary purpose in criticizing some of the focus of current
research is to point out the unmet intellectual challenge, there are also
related policy issues. At least some of the recent research seems to want
to breach the wall between allocative and distributive issues that has
stood so long in academic discussions of regulatory issues. The reasons
for this are debatable, but, whatever their source, the infirmities of "make
price equal marginal cost and send a check to the losers" advice are
heeded at several points in these articles. Bailey and Willig discard this
paradigm at the formal level, since their model starts with a marriage of
allocative and distributive objectives as a given for the regulator. If one
thing is clear from the discussion of excess capacity in railroads, it is
the practical failure of our traditional advice. Finally, one of the motives
to the marriage of the economics of regulation and the economics of
politics is recognition of the practical link between economics and politics
in regulatory policy.
The inference I choose to draw from the practical failure and the perhaps
impending intellectual disintegration of the traditional policy advice of
regulatory economists is that policy advice is not our strong point. An
earlier generation of economists, with fewer policy problems tempting
them, might have told us to stick to organizing the facts of the world
intelligibly and systematically. If we follow this advice well, our impactPeltzman 382
on policy may increase. Since the impact is so small now and since "Policy
Implications" is likely to remain the traditional conclusion to papers on
regulation, this is a fairly safe prediction. Here again we are forced to
proceed on less firm theoretical ground than we would like. This means
that one day we may find out that the very categories in which we com-
municate with policymakers have little relevance for them. However,
for now, any economist who wants to do "policy-relevant" work is forced
to run that risk. If costs and benefits of the type we usually focus on are
relevant for policy, the policymakers will inevitably have to deal with
their magnitudes. Here I believe, economists have started to develop a
methodology that can substantially reduce these policy-information costs.
In may cases the policymaker will, at least crudely, "know the score"
without our help. Bankruptcies of short-haul, low-density railroads will,
for example, get part of Levin's message across. However, consider the
position of a politician whose constituency is not directly affected by
the problems of short-haul, low-density railroads. He or she may be
reluctant to vote for subsidizing these railroads, but fearful that without
a "yea" vote a massive disaster will befall a political ally from another
district. For such a swing voter, the sort of information provided by
Levin's work, which pins down the consequences of the existing policy,
can be far more valuable than a priori arguments about the desirability
of free entry and exit. The other side of this is that policymakers looking
for the "facts" will have to rely heavily on economists in these matters.
The sport we have developed of debunking purely technical attempts at
getting the "facts" is symptomatic. No competitor has succeeded in
challenging our ability to organize data around a consistent theoretical
superstructure in matters relevant for social policy.
Perhaps a better example of the policy payoff of our giving empirical
content to theoretical issues is the current state of airline regulation.
Congressional acceptance of deregulation and increased implementation
of the basic principles of competition by the CAB provide a rare example
of political endorsement of the professional consensus. But the pro-
fessional consensus, backed by a priori arguments about lack of scale
economies in the business and perhaps a few casual observations about
experience in deregulated markets, was achieved well before policy began
changing. What I want to suggest is that it took the weight of a fairly
extensive empirical literature, able to generalize from the experience of
deregulated markets and make precise the range of effects to be expected
from deregulation, before policy changed—or at least before politicians
felt able to use the work of economists to press for a change in policy.Current Developments 383
Let me quickly recognize some of the risks of generalizing from this
correlation between the flowering of an empirical literature and a shift
in policy:
• The number of "swing" legislators susceptible to academic evidence is
probably unusually large in the particular case of airlines, since the
industry interest is not great in many congressional districts.
• The literature here is unusually well developed. One thinks immedi-
ately of the work of Keyes (1952), Caves (1962), Jordan (1970), Eads
(1975), Keeler (1972), Douglas and Miller (1974), and the CAB's own
economics staff, and fears that the list is incomplete. The quantity is
matched by quality, and this combination may well be unmatched in
the literature on the economic effects of regulation.
• There is probably by now a professional consensus, backed by a
growing empirical literature, that regulation of exit from railroading is
very costly. However, there has been little change in policy.
• Policy has changed in the same direction as a professional
consensus, which had no strong empirical base. I am thinking here of
the deregulation of stock-brokerage commissions. My casual judgment
is that most economists would have "voted" with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on this in the belief that the industry was
structurally competitive. However, even if this is so, the direct role of
economists in the process was peripheral.
In view of all these cross-currents, I am left less with any strong con-
clusions than with a tentative hypothesis: that the impact of economists
on policy is indirect, and that the empirical support for their arguments
weighs more heavily on policymakers than the arguments themselves.
The justification for providing some future historian of ideas with more
data with which to test this hypothesis is partly to make the sample more
representative, but mainly because I think the choices are limited. The
gap between theoretical possibility and empirical grounding has become
so great in so much of regulatory economics that achieving a professional
consensus, not to mention professional development, is going to compel
us to look harder and harder at just how the world really works.
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